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In this article, the authors present the case for
a globally effective remedial tax on
cryptocurrency transactions that could help
fund multinational relief efforts, such as
providing aid to jurisdictions affected by the
COVID-19 virus and countries fighting the
opioid crisis.
The COVID-19 pandemic cannot last forever.
When it is behind us, the world will probably
ask China to pay for huge economic and
humanitarian losses based on the belief that the
spread of disinformation pertaining to COVID-19
1
caused the world to underestimate its severity. If
China does not pay (and it likely will not), the
international community should look for a global

1

See Ken Ritter, “Lawsuit: China Hid Virus Information, Should Pay
Billions,” Associated Press, Mar. 24, 2020. See also Sadanand Dhume,
“Delhi Isn’t Buying Beijing’s Coronavirus Hero Act,” The Wall Street
Journal, Apr. 2, 2020.

TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, MAY 25, 2020

revenue source to help fund the response to health
emergencies. A globally effective remedial tax on
cryptocurrency could help fund much-needed
humanitarian assistance to jurisdictions
debilitated by COVID-19 — and it could help the
world prepare for the inevitable pandemics that
seem all too likely to occur in the future.2
It is no secret that criminals have been dealing
drugs3 and conducting other illicit business on the
dark web for years.4 These transactions and the
income they produce are notoriously untaxed
largely because cryptocurrency is the preferred
medium of exchange. Much like cash transactions,
the use of cryptocurrencies on the dark web can
leave no trace of the transacting parties’
identities.5 Occasionally law enforcement can
track down illicit activities, including by using
undercover agents to pose as potential buyers on
the dark web or following credible leads from
6
informants, but they lack a systematic means to
pierce through criminals’ anonymity. This leaves
the vast majority of wrongdoers uncaught, their

2

See Hiroshi Kaneko, “Proposal for International Humanitarian Tax –
A Consumption Tax on International Air Travel,” Tax Notes Int’l, Dec. 14,
1998, p. 1911 (proposing, more than 20 years ago, a humanitarian tax on
international air travel with the funds used to provide relief for disaster
victims).
3

See testimony of Kirsten D. Madison, assistant secretary, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before the Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control, “Stopping the Poison Pills:
Combating the Trafficking of Illegal Fentanyl From China” (Oct. 2, 2018).
4

See Peter D. Hardy, Alicia M. Went, and Shauna Pierson, “IRS CI
Highlights International Efforts to Tackle Cryptocurrency Abuse, Money
Laundering and Tax Evasion,” Ballard Spahr LLP Money Laundering
Watch blog, Dec. 9, 2019.
5

See Caitlin Reilly, “Cryptocurrencies Complicate Effort to Stop
Opioid Dealers,” Roll Call, Oct. 29, 2019.
6

See Chainalysis Team, “Chainalysis in Action: Analyzing a Fentanyl
Dealer’s Cryptocurrency Transactions,” Chainalysis blog, Oct. 1, 2019.
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illicit profits untaxed, and their victims unaided
and alone.7
From a revenue perspective, law
enforcement’s obsession with unveiling criminals’
identity is somewhat misguided. Anonymity (or
relative anonymity) is a magnet that draws
criminals into the cryptocurrency world, which is
a world that actually allows authorities to gauge
the value of the illicit goods being exchanged as
long as the transactions are recorded on the
cryptocurrency’s public ledger. Imposing a flatrate sales tax on dark web transactions based on
the value exchanged becomes easy, and it is
particularly desirable if the funds are used to
purchase medical supplies during a pandemic
like COVID-19 or provide humanitarian
assistance in its aftermath. These funds can be
used more generally for a range of apt, publicspirited ends such as reducing opioid overdoses,
helping survivors of human trafficking, curtailing
global dissemination of child pornography, and
responding to terrorist attacks.
In this remedial model, cryptocurrency’s
perceived financial anonymity functions as a bait
that lures criminals to feed. The tax authorities
may not know exactly who the criminals are or
even what illicit goods they exchanged, but
nonetheless the authorities can still collect a tax on
their sales proceeds and put the revenue to good
use. Without anonymity, criminals would be
scared away and would leave the tax authorities
little to work with.
‘Catch Me if You Can’
Probably as part of a publicity campaign to
simultaneously boost the public’s confidence in
the government and discourage criminals from
using cryptocurrencies, law enforcement has been
touting the fact that some of the most widely used
cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, are only
pseudo-anonymous. This means they can be
traced using forensic analysis.
Forensic analysis starts with a bitcoin
address’s transaction history.8 From there, law

enforcement focuses on points of vulnerability —
that is, times when the investigator might
discover the criminal’s identity, such as when the
9
cryptocurrency is exchanged for fiat currency.
Because U.S.-registered cryptocurrency
exchanges must comply with know-yourcustomer and anti-money-laundering (AML)
regulations, authorities can subpoena the
exchange to obtain information about specific
10
users under investigation.
Many non-U.S.-registered exchanges,
however, do not necessarily comply with U.S.
AML regulations because their home jurisdictions
may have different — and often more lax —
11
rules. Without effective coordination between
jurisdictions, cross-jurisdictional investigations
are likely to end in deadlock.
In 2019 three researchers based in Australia —
Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen, and Tālis J.
Putniņš — estimated that there are at least $76
billion worth of illegal activities per year
involving bitcoin, which translates to about 46
12
percent of all bitcoin transactions. Their study
took a sample composed of previously identified
bitcoin users associated with dark web activities
and used information regarding these known bad
actors to estimate the total amount of illicit
activity involving bitcoin.
Despite its popularity, bitcoin is not the only
cryptocurrency gaining traction in the dark web
world. In a 2018 study requested by the European
Parliament, two Belgium-based researchers,
Robby Houben and Alexander Snyers, made
policy recommendations to the EU based on their
study of 10 altcoins that had the highest market
capitalization at the time.13 They suggested that
the EU to create more weak spots by subjecting
more players in the cryptocurrency market, such

9

See Matthew Cronin, “Hunting in the Dark: A Prosecutor’s Guide to
the Dark Net and Cryptocurrencies,” 66(4) Atty’s Bull. 65 (July 2018).
10

For example, in United States v. Coinbase Inc., No. 3:17-cv01431 (N.D. Cal. 2017), a court granted the IRS’s request for information
about some of Coinbase’s customers because the IRS had reason to
suspect some users did not report gains. Coinbase was responsible for
keeping the data because of AML regulations.
11

7

See Robby Houben and Alexander Snyers, “Cryptocurrencies and
Blockchain: Legal Context and Implication for Financial Crime, Money
Laundering and Tax Evasion,” European Parliament TAX3 Committee
(July 2018).
8

See Chainalysis Team, supra note 6.
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See Craig Adeyanju, “What Crypto Exchanges Do to Comply With
KYC, AML and CFT Regulations,” Cointelegraph, May 17, 2019.
12

See Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš, “Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How
Much Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?” 32(5) Rev.
Fin. Stud. 1798 (May 2019).
13

See Houben and Snyers, supra note 7.
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as miners, virtual currency exchange services, and
custodian wallet providers, to the EU’s due
diligence and registration requirements.
While blockchain technology has largely
eliminated the role of financial institutions in
transactions, Houben and Snyers propose
inserting regulated intermediaries at various
points in cryptocurrency transactions so that
AML regulations attach to identifiable persons.
This will give law enforcement more
opportunities to pierce through the anonymity
that is a feature of so many cryptocurrencies.
Notably, Houben and Snyers’ plan is
philosophically incompatible with the vision of
Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonymous author of
the white paper “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic
Cash System,” which was released simultaneously
with the bitcoin application, and sought to create
“a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash
[that] would allow online payments to be sent
directly from one party to another without going
through a financial institution.”14 If implemented,
Houben and Snyers’ proposal would effectively
nullify the most innovative aspects of the
blockchain technology.
In practice, however, the regulatory reforms
that they propose may not be enough to complete
the transformation of cryptocurrencies into fiat
currencies that rely on financial institutions acting
as trusted third parties. As the pair acknowledge,
the use of forensic analysis to uncover a user’s
identity cannot be made into:
a standardized approach to tackle money
laundering, terrorist financing and tax
evasion more widely: discovering
identities in this way is too complex and
costly to become the general answer to
tackling this issue — and moreover, it will
not certainly lead to any result.15
While Houben and Snyers’ policy
recommendations would certainly give law
enforcement more tools to work with, their study
— taken together with the work of the three
Australian researchers — ultimately suggests that
without credible leads from informants or
14

Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” (Oct.
31, 2008).
15

Houben and Snyers, supra note 7.
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undercover agents to narrow down the targets,
law enforcement is unlikely to have the
bandwidth to conduct comprehensive
investigations on the millions of cryptocurrency
addresses that might be linked to illicit activities.
After all, Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš estimate
that, as of August 2017, at least 27 million bitcoin
market participants were using the
cryptocurrency primarily for illegal purposes to
16
conduct some 37 million transactions each year.
The optimism surrounding the use of forensic
analysis to fight cryptocurrency-enabled crime is
disproportionate to its practical utility. The vast
majority of criminals using cryptocurrencies are
daring, in some cases even taunting, law
enforcement: “Catch me if you can.”
The Remedial Tax Proposal
The Question of Value
Not only does the remedial model work better
with blockchain technology’s decentralizing
feature, it is also more administrable in practice
than relying on forensic analysis. Although the
remedial tax alone does not provide justice to the
victims of crypto crimes, it does ensure funds are
readily available to make a real and positive
impact on their lives. The key to taxing illicit
goods is finding a reliable and accurate indicator
of the value of goods transacted.
Transaction size might be a starting point for
value. Taking bitcoin as an example, a byte is the
measuring unit of the size of a bitcoin transaction.
Transaction size, however, is not directly
reflective of the amount of funds transferred.
We can calculate the size of a bitcoin
transaction as follows:17 If our transaction has in
inputs and out outputs, the transaction size (in
bytes) will be:
in x 180 + out x 34 + 10 plus or minus in
If our transaction has one input and two
outputs, then the transaction size should be 258
bytes as follows:
1 x 180 + 2 x 34 + 10 + - 1

16

See Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš, supra note 12.

17

See Kai Sedgwick, “How to Calculate Bitcoin Transaction Fees
When You’re in a Hurry,” Bitcoin.com, Nov. 27, 2017.
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Here, “input” is related to the source or origin
of the bitcoins used in the transaction, while
“output” denotes the number of recipients.
Notably, there is a transaction fee associated with
each bitcoin transaction. The fee is not related to
the amount transferred; instead, it is based on
how the sender received the funds in the first
place and the number of recipients.
The chief technology officer and one of the
founders of Ripple, a U.S.-based technology
company that primarily serves as a currency
exchange and remittance network, David
Schwartz, explains:
Imagine if you walk into a candy store and
are told that a candy bar is 35 cents, but
then when they rang you up, they tacked
on a 15 cent fee. When you asked them
what it was for, they explained that the
previous customer had paid them all in
pennies, and in order to give you your
change, they’d have to count all those
18
pennies, and that takes more time.
So if the buyer obtained the bitcoins used in
the transaction from several different sources, the
input number would be larger and, based on the
formula above, there would be a higher
transaction fee. In short, bitcoin bases its
transaction fee on how the funds are structured; it
has nothing to do with the value of the transaction
itself and thus is not a useful indicator of such.
A better indicator of the value of goods
exchanged is the difference between the sender’s
starting balance and the funds in the sender’s
change address after the transaction. In a bitcoin
transaction, if A has a balance of BTC 3 and wants
to pay BTC 0.5 to B, A cannot simply send BTC 0.5
and keep the remaining BTC 2.5 in her wallet.19
Instead, A must spend the whole BTC 3 and
designate BTC 0.5 to B while sending the
remaining BTC 2.5 back to a change address that
A controls.

Originally, bitcoin wallets asked users to
designate a change address if they were not
spending their whole balance. Now, so-called
deterministic wallets automatically generate
change addresses. To preserve bitcoin users’
privacy, these automatically generated change
addresses are different from the users’ initial
addresses (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
In Figure 1, transactions 1-5 involve an
anonymous user who starts with a net balance of
BTC 11.852428 and repeatedly sends BTC 0.8 to
another bitcoin address. For each transaction,
after the deduction of 0.8 BTC plus transaction
fees, the remaining balance is returned to a
change address that the sender controls.
Although it is unclear what the BTC 0.8 in this
example is spent for, if it is used to purchase illicit
goods then the dollar value corresponding to BTC
0.8 at the time of the transaction is the best
indication of the actual purchase price. A flat rate
remedial tax should be attached to the BTC 0.8
purchase price. This is akin to consumers paying
a sales tax in the United States. In the remedial
model proposed herein, the BTC 0.8 purchase
price would be subject to a flat rate tax.
Thus, instead of using transaction size as a
yardstick, the difference between a bitcoin user’s
starting and remaining balance — even if these
amounts are technically in two different accounts
— is a more reliable and accurate benchmark of
the illicit goods’ actual value.
Example: Bitcoin’s Blockchain
Although the transacting parties’ identities
are private on bitcoin’s blockchain, the details of
their transactions are not. In Figures 2 and 3 (a
randomly chosen record of a bitcoin transaction
on its blockchain), an anonymous user with a
starting balance of $1,590.10 spends $272.54 and
ends up with $1,308.81 in her change address.
Again, the records do not show what this user
received for the $272.54. However, if the money is
used for illicit purposes, the remedial tax should
apply to this dollar amount because it is best
reflection of the actual purchase price of the goods
or services that the user obtained.

18

This quote is from Schwartz’s answer to a StackExchange
discussion thread started by the user macintosh264 titled “How to
Calculate Transaction Size Before Sending (Legacy Non-Segwit —
P2PKH/P2SH).” Both the question and answer were first posted on Sept.
22, 2011.
19

See Harsh Agrawal, “What Are Unspent Transaction Outputs
(UTXOs)?” Coinsutra (last updated Sept. 6, 2019).
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A Supranational Body to Administer the Tax
As illustrated above, bitcoin’s blockchain does
not disclose transacting parties’ IP addresses.
Therefore, if the tax was administered at a
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national level, jurisdictions would be likely to
make competing claims to the collected proceeds.
At a minimum, resolving potential jurisdictional
conflicts would require knowledge of the
transacting parties’ tax residences. Intrusive
disclosures like this would ruin the privacy
appeal of cryptocurrency. It is, however, worth
noting that not all users of cryptocurrency are
motivated by anonymity; there are subsets who
primarily seek currency stability and others who
like the digital mobility of cryptocurrency.
To avoid the extra headache, it would be
preferable to have a supranational body like the
United Nations administer the remedial tax and
distribute the funds according to a particular
jurisdiction’s needs. For example, when a
jurisdiction is battling an opioid pandemic — a
plight often associated with cryptocurrency — it
could apply to the administering body for
appropriate funds proportionate to the scale and
severity of the crisis, and use the funds to reduce

TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, MAY 25, 2020

instances of overdosing and develop more
advanced technology to detect opioids at port of
entry. Similarly, the funds can provide relief for
the economic impact of COVID-19 and other
health epidemics. It would not be necessary for a
health emergency to be directly associated with
cryptocurrency transactions on the dark web for a
jurisdiction to be eligible to receive remedial
funds, but the health crisis would need to be
multinational and not simply local.
Successful implementation of the remedial tax
would require strong international cooperation
and political will.
Considering Legal Uses of Cryptocurrency
Exceptions would not be needed if
cryptocurrencies were used solely for illicit
purposes. However, approximately half of all
bitcoin transactions are not (at least on their face)
associated with dark web activities or known bad
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20

actors. Obviously, given the nature of the
inquiry, data regarding the prevalence of illicit use
of all crypto coins are limited. Still, it seems
reasonable to say that not all cryptocurrency
transactions involve illegal purposes. Thus, a
sweeping remedial tax encompassing all
cryptocurrency transactions seems excessive.
20

See Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš, supra note 12. But see Chainalysis,
“The 2020 State of Crypto Crime” (Jan. 2020). Chainalysis released a
report in January estimating that only about 1.1 percent of
cryptocurrency transactions are for illicit purposes. However, in our
opinion, the report does not adequately explain why its limited sample
of a few known bad actors is representative of or proportional to the
cryptocurrency ecosystem at large.
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There are two main categories of legitimate
uses of cryptocurrencies. The first group includes
those who use cryptocurrencies to escape the
repercussions of particular actions amid
authoritarian regimes and minorities who want
financial secrecy to avoid prejudice or peer
pressure. For example, some individuals living
under a repressive regime may want to purchase
virtual private networks to gain uncensored
access to the internet; in doing so, they must avoid
leaving a trail of financial information that could
lead to their arrest or even imprisonment.
For these individuals — those who use
cryptocurrencies to preserve financial privacy —
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, MAY 25, 2020
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the remedial tax can be viewed as a premium.
From an enforcement point of view, it would be
difficult to distinguish illicit uses of
cryptocurrency’s privacy features from legitimate
ones without destroying the desired anonymity.
Because anonymity is a function that fiat currency
does not provide, paying a premium for financial
privacy makes sense from a consumer’s point of
view.
A second group of legal uses of
cryptocurrencies includes many large-volume
transactions undertaken for speculative
purposes.21 Opportunistic investors often hold
cryptocurrencies as investment assets. For these
individuals and investment companies, financial
privacy is not a key factor. Rather, they hope to
generate sizeable returns, and the fact that they
are investing in cryptocurrency is usually not a
secret.
It seems unfair to apply the remedial tax to
these investors. This problem, however, could be
remedied by offering refunds or tax credits to
investors who are not looking for financial
privacy. They could either seek refunds directly
from the administering body or claim tax credits
from their local tax authorities. For investors, the
tradeoff is that they must disclose financial
information to gain tax benefits. Unfortunately,
refunds are hard to oversee and prone to fraud.
Alternatively, an exemption can apply to all
transactions for which the taxpayer can show a
local sales tax or VAT has been imposed and paid.
All transactions would be assessed the remedial
tax, but the transactions would not be specifically
identified. If an individual did not want to claim
an exemption for local taxes, then, by default, the
user would pay the remedial tax on all
transactions whether legal or illicit. The
individual’s identity and activity would remain
relatively private but, by paying the remedial tax,
the user would contribute significantly to global
relief activities. Compliant cryptocurrencies could
imbed the remedial tax directly into their
protocols as a condition of using the product, and
the systems would automatically add the tax to
each transaction. The administering body would
be responsible for certifying that the modification

worked, but the cryptocurrency companies would
withhold tax on its behalf. In effect, the remedial
tax would be a cost of conducting business using
cryptocurrencies.
This proposal necessarily requires
jurisdictions to cede taxing authority over
cryptocurrencies to a supranational authority. The
concession would be conditional. If the national
tax authority were able to impose a tax on
cryptocurrency transactions conducted by its
resident nationals, the remedial tax would be
extinguished and the funds returned to the
cryptocurrency provider and, eventually, the
users. In this respect, the remedial tax would
facilitate domestic compliance in one of the most
difficult enforcement areas.
Monero: A Game Changer?
A Cryptocurrency Designed for Privacy
Although the chance that a crypto criminal
will actually be caught is slim, the mere possibility
is enough to cause some sleepless nights. Because
there is a market for crypto coin that is even more
private, those with the technical know-how (and a
desire to make money) invented Monero.
Developed in 2014, Monero uses three
techniques to promote financial secrecy. The first
involves stealth addresses — Monero generates
22
new addresses for every transaction. Address
reusage is a major privacy flaw in bitcoin because
it enables law enforcement or another party to
track the various incoming and outgoing
23
transactions from a single address. To solve this
problem, Monero obscures destination addresses
in its blockchain.
Monero’s second privacy technique, ring
signature, mixes the identity of the actual signer
of a transaction with that of other possible
signers.24 These possible signers — essentially,
decoys — are selected from past transaction
outputs on Monero’s blockchain to form a
distinctive ring signature that makes it
22

See The Monero Project, “Stealth Addresses: The Basics,”
Moneropedia (last accessed Mar. 31, 2020).
23

See Chainalysis Team, supra note 6 (address reusage made it
possible for Chainalysis to conduct a forensic analysis of a drug dealer’s
bitcoin transactions).
24

21

See Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš, supra note 12.
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See The Monero Project, “The Basics of Ring Signature,”
Moneropedia (last accessed Mar. 31, 2020).
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exponentially more difficult, if not impossible, for
an observer to trace the transaction back to the
actual signer.25
The third technique — ring confidential
transactions or RingCT — hides the amount
transferred in a Monero transaction so that it does
26
not appear on its blockchain. Monero achieves
this by using a Pedersen commitment, a tool that
uses randomly generated variables to obscure the
27
actual amount of funds transferred. This scheme
allows the user to keep a piece of data — such as
the actual amount transferred — secret, but
commit to it so that the user cannot later change
his mind. In other words, even if the commitment
value is public, no one knows the actual amount
transferred. Meanwhile, the commitment scheme
keeps the transacting parties honest, allowing the
Monero protocol to ensure the integrity of its
blockchain’s bookkeeping.

25

See id. See also Bisade Asolo, “Monero Ring Signature Explained,”
Mycryptopedia, Nov. 1, 2018.
26

See Asolo, “Monero Ring Confidential Transactions (RingCT),”
Mycryptopedia, Nov. 1, 2018.
27

See Shen Noether, Adam Mackenzie, and Monero Core Team,
“Ring Confidential Transactions,” Monero Research Lab (Feb. 2016).
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Monero’s first two privacy features can coexist
with the remedial tax because they merely add
more layers of protection to ensure its users’
financial privacy. However, Monero’s third
privacy feature cannot — it is specifically
designed to obfuscate the amount of funds
transferred, making it impossible to gauge the
value of goods exchanged. Figure 4 illustrates
what a Monero transaction looks like on its
blockchain.
The transaction amount is concealed because
of Monero’s RingCT technology. Unless there is
another means by which to gauge the transaction
amounts, Monero presents an existential threat to
the feasibility of the remedial tax.
Reconciling the Remedial Tax With Monero
Because of Monero’s special features,
cryptocurrency users would be drawn to Monero
to gain privacy and avoid the remedial tax,
thereby significantly shrinking the revenue pool.
To reconcile Monero with the remedial tax, the
administering body would need to negotiate with
Monero’s core development team and ask them to
change the protocol and reveal transaction
amounts. If these negotiations stalemate, the
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administering body may consider banning
financial institutions from dealing with Monero
altogether. Because cryptocurrencies are merely
computer codes with no intrinsic value except for
the value that is widely accepted by others,
Monero would become worthless if it cannot be
exchanged for fiat currency.
Ideally, a compromise would be reached that
would allow Monero to continue its use of stealth
addresses and ring signatures. It would, however,
need to make a concession and reveal transaction
amounts or at least propose an alternative plan
that would allow the transactions to be subject to
the remedial tax.
Conclusion
The remedial tax is a compromise. It
recognizes and respects an individual’s legitimate
financial privacy interest, but it also recognizes
that financial anonymity will inevitably attract
criminals. Legal and illegal uses of
cryptocurrency are (and would remain)
indistinguishable. While not perfect, the remedial
tax offers a workable solution. It would assess a
global tax on all cryptocurrency transactions with
the proceeds kept in reserve for global
emergencies, and it would accomplish this in a
manner that respects legitimate local taxing
interests. Ultimately, the remedial tax would only
be imposed on transactions that, for whatever
reason, a resident jurisdiction is unable to tax.
Jurisdictions would conditionally cede the
authority to impose the proposed remedial tax
proposed to the U.N. or another supranational
agency to achieve a level of justice not reachable
today.
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